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Karbala in the Umayyad Mosque
Sunnite Panic at the “Shiitization” of Syria in the 2000s
Thomas Pierret
On an afternoon of April 2008, about a hundred people were attending a 
lesson in Sunnite theology at the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus. Sud-
denly, lamentations were heard that almost drowned out the voice of the 
teacher. The lamentations were emanating from a group of Iranian pilgrims 
gathered around a man singing the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at the 
battle of Karbala. Visibly upset by this vocal interference, the Sunnite 
scholar asked his audience to repeat after him a sentence from the book he 
was explaining. He reiterated his request several times and invited the stu-
dents to raise their voices. The audience progressively went along with the 
game, so that the “chorus” eventually resonated throughout the immense 
prayer hall.1
 This struggle for the soundscape of Damascus’ most sacred mosque illus-
trates the tensions that have arisen as a result of increasingly visible Shiite 
religious activities in Syria during the last three decades, and more particu-
larly during the past five years.2 In the midst of the 2000s, indeed, the for-
mer homeland of the Umayyads—the most glorious dynasty of Sunnite 
history, but a faction of usurpers in the eyes of the Shiites—has been seen 
by many as the target of a wide-scale plan of “Shiitization” (tashayyu‘) mas-
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terminded by Iran. According to this narrative, the Islamic Republic has 
taken advantage of its strategic alliance with the Alawite-dominated regime 
of Damascus to spread the Imami creed in Syria. The same narrative asserts 
that although such activities started under Hafiz al-Asad, their growth was 
facilitated after 2000 by the even more pronounced pro-Shiite bias of his 
son Bashar.3
 These claims must be handled with the greatest caution, since the theory 
of a “Shiite Crescent” has been chiefly promoted by sides like pro-Western 
Arab regimes, the Syrian opposition, and anti-Syrian Lebanese parties, 
which have aimed to neutralize the popular appeal of the anti-Israeli/anti-
US stance of the Syrian-Iranian axis. Yet, one cannot rebuff the aforemen-
tioned narrative without further ado: whereas in Palestine, for instance, 
similar rumours are obviously groundless,4 in Syria, there are Twelver reli-
gious institutions that enjoy substantial financial means and a growing 
margin of action. The Shiitization narrative thus relies on a complex inter-
twining of facts and propaganda that this chapter aims to unravel.
 The first part of this chapter is devoted to the growing visibility of the 
Shiite presence in Syria during the twentieth century. The second part deals 
with the evolution of Sunnite-Shiite relations in the country from the end 
of the Ottoman Empire to the 1990s. Finally, in the third part of the chap-
ter, an analysis is provided of the panic surrounding Shiitization that took 
hold of Syrian Sunnis during the 2000s.
Background: the growing visibility of Twelver Shiites in twentieth 
century Syria
During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and particularly since the 
1980s, Syria has witnessed a marked development of Shiite presence and 
activities on its soil. This situation is the result of four main processes: the 
revival of the small local Imami community, rapprochement between the 
Alawite sect and Ja‘fari doctrines, the settlement of Iraqi refugees, and the 
establishment of a strategic alliance between Damascus and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.
 Shiite communities have lived in various parts of Syria for centuries. 
According to the last census that included figures on the country’s sectarian 
composition, which dates back to 1953, Shiites represented only 0.4 per 
cent of the total population at that time.5 Until the early twentieth century, 
moreover, they had no scholarly tradition, and hence a very limited visibil-
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ity in the local religious landscape. The awakening of the Damascene com-
munity was initiated by Ayatollah Muhsin al-Amin, a reformist cleric from 
Jabal ‘Amil (now South Lebanon) who settled in the city in 1901.6 On his 
arrival, al-Amin sought financial support from local Twelver merchant fami-
lies in order to set up a school and the very first private Islamic charity in 
Syria. These institutions, which were later named after their founder (al-
Muhsiniyya), still exist today and remain under the control of Shiite nota-
ble families. The Ayatollah’s role in the modern history of the Damascene 
Imami community was so significant that the latter’s stronghold in the Old 
City is now known as “the quarter of al-Amin”. The sheikh’s fame far 
exceeded the limits of the Levant, not only because he was a marja‘, that is, 
one of the most respected Shiite scholars of his time, but also because he 
took part in journal-mediated controversies with such prominent figures as 
the Egyptian Sunnite reformist Rashîd Ridâ. Since al-Amin’s death in 1952, 
no religious leader of such a calibre has emerged among his Syrian coreli-
gionists. However, the institutions set up by the Ayatollah have continued 
to thrive during the following decades thanks to the rapprochement 
between Twelver Islam and the Alawite minority, which has dominated the 
state apparatus for more than four decades now.
 Although the Alawite creed has its roots in the Shiite tradition, as shown 
by its veneration of Imam Ali, it has long been considered heretical by both 
Sunnite and Imami scholars. Rapprochement (taqrīb) with Shiite clerics 
from Lebanon and Iraq only developed from the early 1910s onwards due 
to three factors.7 First, a reformist trend emerged within the community 
that aimed to rationalize the Alawite faith by drawing from the—incompa-
rably more elaborated—Twelver scholarly tradition. Second, separate reli-
gious courts for the Alawis were established in 1922 by the French 
authorities, and the reformists pushed for the adoption of Ja‘afari law in 
place of customary rules. Third, the leaders of the community who advo-
cated the creation of an independent Alawite state within the coastal region 
were marginalized in the late 1930s at the hand of their pro-Syrian unity 
nationalist rivals, who sought to get closer to the Islamic mainstream by 
stressing their Shiite identity.
 Rapprochement deepened from the late 1940s onwards due to the fact 
that Iraqi and Lebanese religious networks identified the Alawite mountains 
as a “mission field”. In 1951, these networks helped Alawite scholars to set 
up the Ja‘fari Society, whose name eloquently illustrated the agenda of the 
community’s reformist trend. One of the first initiatives of the society was 
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to lobby for the official recognition of Ja‘fari law by the Syrian state, which 
it obtained in 1952.
 Following Hafiz al-Asad’s coup in 1970, the process of rapprochement 
took a more distinctly political turn. As the first non-Sunnite head of state 
since independence, the Alawite General encouraged rapprochement with 
the Shiites as a way to stress his community’s belonging to Islam. He there-
fore lent full support to those reformist Alawite men of religion who had 
promoted both “Ja‘farization” and national unity since the 1930s. He also 
sought the support of prominent Shiite clerics. The first to provide such 
support was the Iraqi Hasan al-Shirazi, the brother of Ayatollah Muham-
mad al-Shirazi and main ideologue of the “Shiraziyya”, a presently transna-
tional movement that originated in Karbala.8 Between his expulsion from 
Iraq in 1970 and his assassination in Beirut ten years later, Hasan al-Shirazi 
lived in Lebanon and Syria. In the latter country, the authorities enthusias-
tically welcomed him as an opponent to the rival Iraqi regime. Al-Shirazi 
reciprocated by stressing the Alawites’ belonging to Shiite Islam in the fore-
word of a booklet published in 1972 by Alawite reformists. In the following 
years, the Iraqi cleric built on his ties with the latter to expend missionary 
efforts among their coreligionists. He reportedly encountered limited suc-
cess because the level of religious observance among Alawites was—and is 
still—relatively low.9
 The second answer to al-Asad’s request came in 1973, when the religious 
and political leader of the Lebanese Twelver community Musa al-Sadr offi-
cially recognized the Alawites as Shiites. Through this move, al-Sadr won a 
powerful patron for his community: in the following decades, the latter’s 
alliance with Syria—through al-Sadr’s Amal movement and later Hizbul-
lah—would constitute a permanent feature of regional politics.
 After 1979, al-Asad’s strategic partnership with revolutionary Iran earned 
him the support of what had now replaced Najaf as the centre of gravity of 
Shiite Islam. Of course, this would not make the Alawites more credible 
“Muslims” in the eyes of many Syrian Sunnis, who were facing harsh repres-
sion as a result of the 1979–82 Islamic uprising. Nevertheless, the Syrian-
Iranian alliance had a major consequence, that is, the unprecedented 
development of Shiite institutions within Syria.
 Syria is home to several shrines that occupy a prominent position in the 
symbolic geography of Imami Islam. The most important of them are 
located in Damascus (tombs of Sayyida Zaynab, the daughter of Imam Ali, 
and of Sayyida Ruqqaya, the daughter of Imam Hussein, “Head of Hussein” 
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in the Umayyad Mosque) as well as in Aleppo (“Mashhad al-Hussein”, a 
place where a drop of blood fell from the head of Imam Hussein). Since the 
1950s, these shrines have been restored thanks to donations originating 
from foreign Shiite merchants, as well as beginning under the Shah, from 
the Iranian state.10 Syria’s alliance with Teheran following the Islamic Revo-
lution entailed substantial Iranian investments in the rebuilding of some of 
these shrines in accordance with the canons of Persian architecture. The 
same occurred in places that were not traditional loci of Shiite worshipping. 
Starting from 1988, the Islamic Republic erected two massive mausoleums 
in the city of Raqqa, the site of the battle of Siffin, on the Euphrates.11 In 
the vicinity of Damascus, a shrine was constructed in Dariya, starting from 
1999, on the tomb of Sukayna, a daughter of Imam Ali, and Shiite clerics 
have taken control of the tomb of the Companion Hajar bin ‘Uday al-Kindi 
in ‘Adra. In Aleppo, Shiite institutions have displayed a growing interest in 
the purported tomb of Muhsin, the son of Imam Hussein, despite the fact 
that local Sunnis consider this burial place as that of a mere saint known as 
“Sheikh Muhsin”.12 These holy places have become the main stops of the 
tourist route that now attracts thousands of Shiite pilgrims, most of them 
Iranians, every year.13
 The other main aspect of foreign Shiite presence in Syria is the develop-
ment of a city of about 200,000 inhabitants around the mausoleum of 
Sayyida Zaynab, in the southern periphery of Damascus. This phenomenon 
results from the transformation of the site into a major Twelver learning 
centre, as well as from the settlement of Iraqi refugees fleeing persecution 
by Saddam Hussein’s regime from the early 1980s onwards and the severe 
hardship imposed by the Western embargo in Iraq in the 1990s; since 2003, 
Shiite presence in the city has further increased as Iraqi refugees have sought 
to escape from sectarian violence in the country.
 In the mid-1970s, Hasan al-Shirazi took advantage of his good relations 
with the Syrian authorities to open the first hawza (religious institute) in 
Sayyida Zaynab. In 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini imitated him, a move that 
was later followed by more than a dozen scholars from Iraq, Iran, and Leba-
non.14 The location proved highly successful as a teaching centre because of 
the weakening of Najaf as a result of Ba‘thi repression, and, as far as Arabs 
were concerned, cultural proximity. Some scholars were also willing to 
escape Iranian tutelage, following the example of many Shirazis who left 
Qom in the late 1980s because of the deterioration of their previously 
excellent relations with the Islamic Republic.15
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 Whereas the hawzāt are mostly designed for foreign Shiite students (Ira-
qis, Lebanese, Gulfians, South Asians, Afghans),16 other institutions also 
address a trans-sectarian Syrian audience, which has fed Sunnite anxiety 
about possible missionary projects. Since the 1990s, the Iranian cultural 
centre has convened regular conferences all over the country, distributed 
religious literature, and offered scholarships to the limited number of Sun-
nis who expressed the desire to study in Qom.17 Al-Najma al-Muhammadi-
yya (“The Muhammadian Star”), an Iraqi Shiite association, has organized 
yearly inter-religious meetings since its creation in 1992.18 However, the 
main source of Sunnite anxiety has been the activities of Iraqi clerics 
belonging to the Shiraziyya: not only because they enjoy a wide margin of 
manoeuvre as a result of the close ties they wove with the regime since the 
early 1970s, but also because their group, which has been focusing exclu-
sively on religious revivalism since it relinquished its political ambitions in 
the late 1980s, is well-known for its aggressive missionary zeal. Shirazi mul-
lahs took control of “Shiite” shrines in the country—and provided most of 
their staff—even before the Iranian state started to fund their develop-
ment.19 One of these mullahs, ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Muhajir, was allowed to 
present a programme on Syrian national television in the early 1990s.20 In 
2001, he opened the Syrian branch of the Committee for Service to the 
People of the House of the Prophet (Hay’a khidma ahl al-bayt), an organiza-
tion whose self-avowed goal is to “spread the thought and culture of the 
People of the House all around the world”.21
 Although Syrian Sunnis have always felt uncomfortable with the growth 
of Shiite institutions in their country, the latter process is not in itself a suf-
ficient explanation for the level of sectarian distrust that was reached in the 
2000s. For one century, indeed, the fluctuations of Sunnite-Shiite relations 
in Syria have always been tightly related to the broader political context.
Sunnite-Shiite relations before the 2000s: the indelible traces 
of the Iranian “treason”
During the first half of the twentieth century, Muslim reformism and Arab 
nationalism stressed the need for unity against Western colonialism, thus 
creating a favourable context for Sunnite-Shiite rapprochement.22 Such was 
the background of Muhsin al-Amin’s effort to improve inter-communal 
relations in Damascus: he maintained good relations with reformist Sunnite 
scholars, hired a Sunnite muezzin for his school, and opposed the creation 
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of separate religious courts for Shiites.23 Although tensions arose following 
the Saudi-Wahhabi conquest of the Hijaz in the mid-1920s,24 Western 
imperialism was still fostering inter-sectarian synergies. In 1938, when the 
Salafi Sheikh Kamil al-Qassab convened the anti-colonial Congress of the 
Ulema in Damascus, he invited ‘Abd al-Karim al-Zanjani, a Najafi scholar 
and champion of Islamic unity.25 In its communiqué, the congress called to 
“unite the voice of the different Islamic schools of thought, which come 
together on the dogma of God’s oneness, the ultimate goals of Islam, and 
the struggle against atheism.”26
 Despite the fact that their leader Mustafa al-Siba‘i had been a disciple of 
Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, a Cairo-based Syrian Salafi and one of the most 
influent anti-Shiite polemicists of the twentieth century,27 the Syrian Mus-
lim Brothers continued to show signs of opening towards Shiites after 
independence. Beside the new impetus given to Islamic ecumenism by the 
foundation in 1948 of the Azhar-sponsored Association for Rapprochement 
in Cairo,28 the reason for this was a sense of solidarity with fellow Islamists 
sharing anti-imperialist and anti-secularist views. In 1955, the Syrian Broth-
ers wholeheartedly welcomed Navvab-e Safavi, the leader of the Iranian 
movement Fada’iyan-e Islam, when he visited Damascus on his way back 
from the Islamic Congress of Jerusalem.29 Al-Siba‘i also introduced the 
study of Ja‘fari law into the curriculum of the Faculty of shari‘a he founded 
at the University of Damascus in 1954.30 It is true that the Brothers’ leader 
ended up deploring the lack of reciprocal efforts among his Twelver coun-
terparts,31 but it was politics, not doctrinal divergences, that eventually 
spoiled Sunnite-Shiite relations in Syria.
 In the mid-1970s, the discontent provoked among Sunnite inhabitants 
of Sayyida Zaynab by the presence of Shirazi clerics forced the authorities 
to rein in the latter’s activities for a while.32 However, widespread anti-Shiite 
resentment had not taken root in the country yet. In the 1970s, Syrian 
Islamists were still reading books of the Iranian thinker Ali Shariati, and 
they enthusiastically welcomed the overthrow of the Shah as an “Islamic” 
rather than a “Shiite” revolution.33 It is probably no accident that the wave 
of assassinations that had struck Syria since 1976 turned into a full-fledged 
insurgency in late 1979, that is, a few months after the birth of the Islamic 
Republic in Teheran. However, despite the fact that the Syrian Muslim 
Brothers had vowed support for his cause, Ayatollah Khomeini chose to 
side with the secular al-Asad, thus paving the way for a long-term strategic 
partnership.34 As a result, the Islamic opposition had no choice but to seek 
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support from the Iraqi regime, which was itself at war with Iran. Teheran’s 
“treason” also prompted several exiled Syrian Islamists to publish pamphlets 
denouncing both Shiite doctrines and Iranian expansionist ambitions.35
 Inside Syria, the outcomes of the alliance with the Islamic Republic fur-
ther strengthened Sunnite distrust. Indeed, the takeover and rebuilding of 
the shrines by Shiite actors generally occurred at the expense of local Sun-
nite inhabitants. In the late 1980s, for instance, the Iranian-funded rebuild-
ing of the tomb of Sayyida Ruqqaya entailed the destruction of a block in 
the old Sunnite quarter of al-‘Amara as well as the replacement of the local 
imam with a Shiite staff. Moreover, the mushrooming of Shiite hawzāt in 
Sayyida Zaynab has been seen by Sunnite clerics as a proof of the double 
standards applied by the regime, which has only allowed for the opening of 
a couple of Sunnite religious institutes since the 1970s. Finally, and as 
already mentioned, many Sunnite believe that Shiite institutions based in 
Syria actually serve missionary projects.
 Such a tense context explains both the regime’s encouragement for inter-
sectarian dialogue and the reluctance of many Sunnite scholars to answer 
positively to this invitation. Indeed, the most frequent participants to 
Sunnite-Shiite public meetings are notoriously compliant religious leaders 
such as the late Grand Mufti Ahmad Kaftaru and his successor Ahmad 
Hassun. The unpopularity of such a stance is well illustrated by the case of 
Aleppo’s Second Mufti Mahmud ‘Akkam. A very popular preacher during 
the 1980s, he was later rejected by many of his admirers because of his 
avowed sympathy for Shiite Islam. In 1989, for instance, he led the “prayer 
of the absent” in memory of Ayatollah Khomeini, a gesture that was badly 
perceived in a city that has close cultural and economic ties with Iraq’s 
Sunnite provinces.36
 Anti-Shiism is thus no new phenomenon among Syrian Sunnis. How-
ever, it reached unprecedented levels in the 2000s as a result of the combi-
nation of increasingly visible Twelver activities in the country, on the one 
hand, and of the rise of sectarian tensions in the Middle East on the other.
The 2000s: Sunnite panic at the “Shiitization” of Syria
In 2001, for the first time in modern Syrian history, a procession of chest-
beating young men organized by the Shirazi Committee for Service to the 
People of the House went through the Old City of Damascus while singing 
hymns vowing to take revenge for the martyrdom of Imam Hussein.37 This 
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martyrdom, as is well known, occurred at the hand of the Umayyad dynasty, 
whose mosque was located just next to the route of the procession. The 
repetition of similar events in the following years infuriated many Sunnis, 
not only because they perceived them as provocative, but also, once again, 
because of their feeling of discrimination, the authorities having banned 
most outdoor Sunnite religious celebrations for four decades. In 2005, 
Sunnite clerics and notables denounced the processions in a petition sent to 
President Bashar al-Asad, in vain.38
 During the same period, there was a feeling in Syria that the expansion 
of Shiite infrastructures was getting a new impetus. The construction of the 
twin mausoleums of Raqqa had started in 1988, but it was only completed 
in 2004 due to several years of interruption. In Darya, the shrine of 
Sukayna bint Ali had been under construction since 1999. As will be shown 
below, the latter initiative aroused strong suspicions among Sunnite reli-
gious leaders, who dismissed the very historical existence of Sukayna bint 
Ali as a Shiite invention and consequently interpreted the building of her 
mausoleum in a Sunnite area as part of a strategy of progressive encroach-
ment: a shrine attracts pilgrims, the presence of pilgrims entails the creation 
of shops selling religious literature and souvenirs, and Shiite influence inevi-
tably spreads among the local population.
 Of course, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees after the 
2003 war played a major role in reinforcing the feeling of “invasion” by 
making Shiite religiosity more visible. This new potential audience also led 
to a surge of activity among Twelver institutions in Sayyida Zaynab. Indeed, 
the first half of the decade saw the multiplication of new hawzāt and reviv-
alist committees founded by scholars wishing to emulate the Shirazis.39 
Here also, the contrast between the regime’s toleration of such organizations 
and the growing repression exerted against the non-violent Salafis—among 
other Sunnite trends—was too obvious not to stir up Sunnite anger. Nev-
ertheless, the wave of anti-Shiism that struck Syria in the mid-2000s cannot 
be understood without taking into account the regional context.
 After 2003, Syrian Sunnis witnessed the rise of Shiite and Iranian influ-
ence in Iraq with much anxiety, a sentiment that translated into genuine 
panic during the full-scale civil war that was ignited by the bombing of the 
mausoleum of Samarra in February 2006. Rumours referred to the founda-
tion of “dozens of husayniyyāt” in Syria,40 and to wide campaigns of prose-
lytizing (tabshīr) targeting in particular the Sunnite population of the 
Jezireh (East of the Euphrates), a predominantly rural area characterized by 
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widespread poverty and illiteracy.41 The region is home to the village of 
Hatla, near Deir ez-Zor, where a community of a few thousand Shiites 
constitutes the only proven and significant case of collective conversion of 
Syrian Sunnis to Shiite Islam since the 1990s.42 The same region is said to 
have been a primary target for the Ali Murtada Association of Jamil al-Asad, 
Hafiz’s brother. This “political grouping behind a religious facade”43 had 
been founded in 1981 in order to mobilize the Alawi community against 
the Islamic opposition. Thanks to its considerable financial and military 
means, it also reportedly managed to recruit a large number of Sunnite 
Arabs and Kurds from the Jezireh until it was banned in 1983.44 Eastern 
Syria has also been a major exporter of labour to Lebanon, which resulted 
in several cases of conversion to Shiism.45
 In the weeks that followed the Samarra bombing, prominent Sunnite 
Muslim scholars started to publicly denounce Shiite “intrigues” in their 
Friday sermons. In Aleppo, Sheikh Mahmud al-Husseini flayed the Imami 
institutions of Raqqa.46 According to him, the latter’s provocations were 
fuelling sectarian discord, thus opening the door to the bad winds coming 
from Iraq:
In two days, around two hundred mosques have been burnt in Iraq […] the same 
phenomenon penetrates in our country, and I condemn it. [He raises his voice] I 
have received an invitation to attend the celebration of the battle of Siffin in Raqqa! 
[He yells] Siffin!! A symbol of war, of factionalism, of divergence!!! Sectarianism 
infiltrates from the East, but it seems that the security services—which pretend they 
are concerned about the unity of the country—do nothing to stop it!!!47
 The next month, Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti, Syria’s most renowned cleric 
and the main pillar of the regime’s religious legitimization, alluded to the 
construction of the tomb of Sukayna bint Ali in Dariya and denounced it 
as a Trojan Horse:
They invent names of imaginary members of the Prophet’s family, they build imagi-
nary tombs thanks to the darkness of the night, and then they build them green 
cupolas. The goal of all this is to take over the surrounding areas. They turn these 
places into springboards for setting one sect against another, into springboards for 
conspiracy and discord.48
 Al-Buti believed that the situation was sufficiently worrying to depart 
from his usual political cautiousness and openly expressed his discontent at 
the authorities’ passivity: “maybe they are too busy with difficult circum-
stances that have plunged them into confusion”. He also implicitly targeted 
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the policy of the Iranian state in Syria: “May God fight politics when it 
disregards principles; May God fight politics when it exploits religion to 
promote its interests.”49
 In the following weeks, the issue of Iranian-backed proselytism in Syria 
emerged in the mainstream Arab media when, in an interview with a 
Kuwaiti newspaper, leading Syrian human rights activist and former mem-
ber of the Muslim Brothers Haytham al-Malih referred to a “secret agree-
ment” between the governments of Damascus and Teheran to “turn Syria 
from a Sunni to a Shiite society”.50 Likewise, the anti-Syrian Lebanese 
magazine al-Watan al-‘Arabi talked of a “strategy of Shiitization” that had 
already resulted in thousands of conversions.51
 At the same time, the promulgation of a decree imposing the closing 
down of Sunnite religious junior high schools reinforced the local ‘ulama’s 
sentiment of discrimination. In a petition against the decree that they sent 
to the president in June 2006, clergymen insisted on the fact that “the 
Shiite hawzāt deliberately disregard the circulars of the Ministry of Educa-
tion”.52 A few weeks earlier, indeed, the directors of the religious institutes 
of Sayyida Zaynab had refused with impunity to attend a meeting organ-
ized by state officials in order to discuss the legal and administrative situa-
tion of their schools, which in the absence of any legal recognition, were 
still operating on the basis of permits issued by the security apparatus.53
 Even though it initially led to a rapprochement between the Sunnite 
clergy and the state, the war that broke out in July 2006 between Israel and 
the Syrian-backed Hizbullah eventually resulted in more tension. During 
the conflict, the distrust generated among the Sunnite ‘ulama by the pro-
Iranian orientation of the Lebanese militia was counterbalanced by a genu-
ine sense of the need for Muslim unity against Israel, by the threat of state 
repression, as well as by a will to stay in tune with a public opinion that 
immediately enthused at the military prowess of Hizbullah: in a largely 
spontaneous move, thousands of yellow Hizbullah flags and portraits of 
Hasan Nasrallah popped up in the country. Certain Friday preachers 
remained ambiguous—they denounced “Zionist barbarity” while not even 
mentioning Hizbullah in their sermons—54 but leading clerics such as al-
Buti and the elite of Aleppo’s ‘ulama openly condemned the “defeatist” 
fatwas issued by Saudi scholars who had forbidden any support to the Leba-
nese party considering the latter’s Imami creed. Al-Buti even claimed that 
these fatwas had been “fabricated” in the United States.55 Sunnite Islamic 
charities also played a leading role in helping the thousands of Lebanese 
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refugees—many of them Shiites—who flooded Damascus during the sum-
mer. The regime was thus indebted to the religious elite, which possibly 
explains the decision not to implement the projected closure of the religious 
junior high schools at the start of the new school year.
 Although Hizbullah’s “Divine Victory” was widely acclaimed by the Syr-
ian population, the prestige won by the Lebanese militia quickly waned as 
a result of renewed rumours of Iranian-backed proselytism, which peaked 
during the autumn of 2006. Once again, Sunnite fears were fuelled by a 
combination of facts and propaganda. As far as facts are concerned, admira-
tion for Hizbullah’s military performances sometimes translated into a more 
strictly religious interest in Shiism. In October 2006, while visiting a young 
committed Sunni of Aleppo, I found a video CD containing a hymn in 
honour of Imam Ali sung by Iraqi Shiite artist Basim al-Karbala‘i, with the 
mausoleum of Najaf as visual background. When asked about the place 
where he had bought this CD, my informant told me to go to Bab al-Faraj, 
a quarter of downtown Aleppo where all kinds of videos are sold, from 
Friday sermons to erotic movies. By way of advertisement, shopkeepers 
usually display the novelties on a TV overlooking the pavement. One of 
them was showing al-Karbala’i’s videos, which were proving highly success-
ful since I saw several of them being sold in about fifteen minutes—all of 
this in a city that is not home to any sizeable Twelver or Alawite commu-
nity. Of course, such a popular interest in Shiite Islam did not amount to 
conversion—my informant, at least, never renounced his Sunnite faith—
but it was sufficient to spread panic among circles that were already afraid 
of Shiite “invasion”. It was also, above all, a piece of good fortune for those 
who had political interests in feeding the phobia.
 The July war, indeed, was immediately followed by an unprecedented 
propaganda campaign denouncing Shiite missionary efforts in Syria and the 
Arab world at large. This campaign was launched by the rivals of the Syrian-
Iranian-Hizbullah axis—i.e. the Syrian exiled opposition, the anti-Syrian 
Lebanese parties, and the main allies of the US in the Arab East (Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan)—which were strongly dissatisfied with the outcome 
of the war. Its heroic resistance to the Israeli offensive had considerably 
strengthened Hizbullah—which now felt confident enough to push for the 
fall of Fu’ad Siniora’s anti-Syrian government—and its sponsoring states, 
whereas it dealt a symbolic blow to “moderate” Arab regimes. Syria’s benefits 
were also obvious in the realm of diplomacy: Western consensus about the 
necessity to isolate the country started to crack during the war, Spanish 
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Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos being the first member of a 
European government to visit Syria since the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri 
in February 2005.56
 For those who were afraid of a reinvigorated al-Asad, a rhetoric counter-
offensive focusing on Iranian proselytism was not only a way to convince 
the targeted audience that the Alawite ruling elite was detrimental to the 
predominantly Sunnite identity of Syria: it was also aimed at depriving the 
Ba‘thist regime from its claimed Arab nationalist legitimacy, since Shiitiza-
tion, anti-Syrian polemicists claimed, was tantamount to the “Iranization” 
or “Persanization” of Syria.57
 In previous years, the Muslim Brothers had avoided engaging in sectarian 
controversies, probably in order not to antagonize potential partners among 
the secular opposition. Starting from early September 2006, however, they 
released scores of alarmist articles that sometimes drew upon the crudest 
versions of conspiracy theory.58 The Iranians, who were occasionally called 
“Safavids”,59 were not only accused of spreading the Twelver creed in the 
Syrian steppe by giving USD 10,000 to each recent convert, but also of 
trying to “modify the country’s demography” through the naturalization of 
thousands of their nationals.60
 This time, rumours of Shiitization were not only echoed by the local 
clergy (Wahba al-Zuhayli, Syria’s most famous specialist of Islamic law, 
denounced a “movement led by the Iranian embassy”)61 but also by Western 
newspapers,62 by the king of Saudi Arabia,63 as well as by two of the world’s 
most influential Sunnite clerics, namely, the head of the World Union of 
Muslim Scholars Yusuf al-Qaradawi,64 and former Saudi opponent Salman 
al-‘Awda.65 A Syrian MP and the Minister of Culture even had to publicly 
deny rumours that the Grand Mufti Hassun had embraced Shiite Islam.66 
In the first weeks of 2007, the situation further deteriorated following the 
execution of Saddam Hussein at the hand of Shiite militiamen, on the one 
hand, and deadly sectarian skirmishes in Beirut, on the other. Discourses 
radicalized throughout 2007: Mufti of Mount Lebanon Ali Juzu, an ardent 
supporter of the Siniora government, spoke of Damascus as “the gateway of 
Persian colonialism”,67 while the Syrian Muslim Brothers described the 
military agreement signed by Damascus and Teheran in June 2006 as tan-
tamount to “the occupation of Syria by Iran”.68 Like all Arab viewers of 
satellite TV channels, Syrians were also exposed to increasingly heated 
debates between representatives of the two sects, as well as openly anti-
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Shiite programmes such as that presented on al-Safa TV by ‘Adnan al-‘Ar‘ur, 
a Syrian Salafi polemicist based in Ryad.
 In order to contain the flames, liegemen of the regime among Sunnite 
and Shiite clerics denied the “false rumours” of Shiitization on pan-Arab 
televisions.69 In November 2006, the Association for Fraternity between the 
Islamic Schools of Law was jointly founded by Salah al-Din Kaftaru, the 
son of the late Grand Mufti Ahmad Kaftaru and the director of the acad-
emy that was named after him,70 and Abdallah Nidham, the head of the 
Twelver association al-Muhsiniyya.71 Since 2004, that is, since the invasion 
of Iraq, the Kaftaru Academy has organized a yearly Sunnite-Shiite con-
gress. In 2007, it welcomed no less than three of such meetings, which were 
held in the presence of Syria’s chief allies among Lebanese Sunnite Islamists, 
namely, prominent thinker Fathi Yakan and representatives of the al-Tawhid 
movement.72 That year, the academy was also the venue for the founding 
congress of the Society of the Ulema of Iraq, a bi-sectarian organization 
aimed at fighting the foreign occupation of the country.73
 The goodwill displayed by the representatives of official Islam towards the 
regime’s promotion of “Islamic unity” should not hide the fact that all Syr-
ian Sunnite clerics were worried about Shiite proselytizing, which they 
perceived as an existential threat to their communal identity. For instance, 
even though Salah al-Din Kaftaru was actively involved in Sunnite-Shiite 
dialogue, his “private” criticisms of Iranian missionary activities were an 
open secret. He was eventually arrested in July 2009, a decision the security 
services justified by, among other things, Kaftaru’s verbal “attacks against 
other religious communities”.74 Even Islamist MP Muhammad Habash, 
who is well known for his very open approach to inter-faith relations, asked 
the Iranian vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Manushehr Muhammadi for 
official clarifications on that issue during a public meeting held in Damas-
cus.75 As for Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti, whose open denunciation of Shiite 
“scheming” has already been mentioned, he seemingly exploited the 
regime’s need for his moral authority in this difficult period in order to 
extract some concessions. In January 2007, in his weekly programme on 
national television, the scholar described the circumstances of Saddam Hus-
sein’s execution as being the result of an American-Zionist conspiracy aimed 
at dividing the Muslims. In order to thwart this plan, he concluded, Sunnis 
and Shiites should form “not merely a tactical, but a strategic” alliance 
against Israel.76 It is probably not a coincidence that, on the very same day, 
the government withdrew the permit of the Association for Social Initiative, 
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a feminist organization which al-Buti had violently criticized for its lobby-
ing in favour of a secular reform of the law on personal status.77
 Being perceived as a threat to the very existence of the Sunnite commu-
nity, Shiite proselytizing has also been the only issue that evenly worried all 
categories of Syrian Islamic actors during the past decade. Indeed, whereas 
clerics generally concentrated on sectoral objectives such as the struggle 
against feminism and the defence of religious schools, lay activists and 
reformist intellectuals embraced a democratic agenda. All of them agreed, 
however, on castigating the Shiite “invasion”. As we have already seen, the 
first Syrian personality to talk about Shiitization in foreign media was the 
human rights activist Haytham al-Malih. Likewise, the reformist intellec-
tual ‘Imad al-Din al-Rachid denounced the founding of “dozens of 
husayniyyāt” in the country on al-Jazeera TV.78 Moreover, the Movement for 
Justice and Development, an AKP-inspired party created in London in 
2006, sponsored the authors of The Shiite Renaissance in Syria, which 
remains the most detailed report on Imami missionary activities in the 
country.79 This report aimed at invalidating what it presented as the emol-
lient results of another study released in 2006 by secular intellectuals.80 
Whereas, according to the latter, Shiitization only concerned a handful of 
families and was not promoted by any actual missionary efforts, the authors 
of The Shiite Renaissance asserted that 8,000 Syrian Sunnis (three-quarters 
of them from the Jezireh) had converted to Twelver Islam between 1999 
and 2007.81
 Rumours of Shiitization decreased somewhat since 2008, partly as a 
result of the regime’s compliance with the Sunnite ‘ulama’s demand to 
obtain the replacement of Iranian ambassador Hassan Ikhtari, a cleric who 
was widely considered to be the mastermind of Shiite missionary activities 
in Syria.82 The main factor that calmed the situation, however, was the 
diminution of sectarian tensions in the Middle East due to the relative 
improvement of the situation in Iraq and Lebanon.
Conclusion
Shiite Islam has become increasingly visible in Syria during the twentieth 
century due to the revival of the local Imami community, the rapproche-
ment between the Alawite sect and Twelver Islam, the influx of Iraqi refu-
gees, and the alliance between the Ba‘thist regime and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. The multiplication of Shiite shrines and religious schools that has 
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been witnessed since the 1970s has provoked widespread discontent among 
the local Sunnis. Indeed, the latter have resented the takeover (or, in some 
cases, perceived blatant invention) of holy sites by Twelver clerics, have 
jealously watched the regime grant foreign Shiites a freedom of action it 
denies to Syrian Sunnis, and have become increasingly convinced that they 
are the target of Iranian-backed missionary projects.
 Although such sentiments were already well entrenched in the late twen-
tieth century, Syrian opponents explain the unprecedented panic at Shiitiza-
tion witnessed in the mid-2000s by pointing to a significant increase in 
Twelver activities that resulted in a growing number of conversions. This 
shift, they claim, resulted from both the deepening of the Syrian-Iranian 
partnership and from Bashar al-Asad’s pronounced goodwill towards Shiite 
missionaries. Such a narrative is questionable in several respects. Of course, 
there is little doubt that many of the Imami clerics who officiate in the 
country wish to win Sunnis over and, in the case of the Shirazis in particu-
lar, hardly conceal their intention to do so. However, to date, there is no 
indisputable proof of a large-scale phenomenon of conversion among Syr-
ian Sunnis. As for the idea that a policy shift on the part of the regime 
occurred during the past decade, it must be seriously qualified. It is true 
that Shiite hawzāt and committees multiplied at that time—probably as a 
result of massive Iraqi immigration—and it is also true that Twelver “provo-
cations” reached a new level with the processions that were organized in 
Damascus from 2001 onwards. At the same time, the circumstances of the 
construction of the mausoleum of Sayyida Ruqqaya, in the late 1980s, or 
the “invention” of the tomb of Sukayna bint Ali, in 1999, show that Hafiz 
al-Asad was not really more worried about the sensitivity of his Sunnite 
subjects than his son Bashar. Finally, seeing Shiite activities in Syria as tan-
tamount to Iranian influence is not entirely accurate either. Indeed, the 
most active Twelver trend in Syria is the Iraqi Shiraziyya, whose ties to the 
Syrian regime preceded the latter’s alliance with Teheran. Although they 
probably coordinate their action in Syria with Iranian institutions, the Shi-
razis also rely on their long-standing and intimate relationship with the 
Alawite community, and, consequently, with the security apparatus, in 
order to fulfil their own missionary agenda.
 In any case, explaining the intensity of anti-Shiite sentiments among 
Syrian Sunnis in the mid-2000s requires taking regional developments into 
account. Since the 1980s, Shiite presence in the country was all the more 
badly perceived because it was associated with Iran, one of the very few 
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states that had chosen to support al-Asad in his war against the Islamic 
opposition. After 2003, the same state was seen as encouraging its Iraqi 
clients to cooperate with the Western invaders. From then on, the curve of 
anti-Shiism in Syria has closely followed regional developments, rather than 
any purported intensification of missionary efforts in the country: a first 
peak was observed in the spring of 2006, that is, right after the start of the 
full-scale civil war in Iraq; in the following summer, tension decreased 
because of widespread admiration for Hezbollah’s facing up to Israel; for 
this very reason, however, rivals of the Syrian-Iranian axis launched an 
unprecedented campaign of propaganda, which provoked hysteria among 
Sunnis all over the Middle East during the autumn of 2006; this trend 
reached its apex after the execution of Saddam Hussein in January 2007; 
and logically, tensions started to decrease in 2008 with the end of the most 
severe phases of the Iraqi and Lebanese crises.
 The Shiite presence in Syria will probably remain a factor of tensions, all 
the more so given that the government does not seem willing or able to 
curb Twelver initiatives in the country: in July 2009, an official permit was 
granted for the building of a new mausoleum near the city of Raqqa.83 
Warnings formulated by prominent religious figures did not stop either: in 
March 2010, ‘A’id al-Qarni, a former Saudi opponent and one of the most 
popular Islamic writers of the last decade, spoke of Iran’s “gigantic efforts” 
to Shiitize Syria.84 At the same time, the Syrian mobile phone operator 
MTN deactivated the service allowing its clients to send SMS to the Salafi 
satellite channel al-Wisal because of the latter’s anti-Shiite stance.85 These 
developments, however, were not enough to reawaken the panic that took 
hold of Syrian Sunnis four years ago. In order to reappear, such a panic will 
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